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1 Introduction
The debate about child-rearing practices has a long history. The Bible recom-
mends strict parenting, including generous use of corporal punishment.1 Disci-
pline and rigor are advocated also by John Locke in Some Thoughts Concern-
ing Education.2 Well-being during childhood is of little concern to the British
philosopher, who views child-rearing as an instrumental process that should el-
evate children out of immaturity, forging a strong adult personality early on.
This perspective is reversed by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in E´mile (Rousseau 1762).
Rousseau regards childhood as an important phase of human existence in its
own right, rather than as mere preparation for adulthood. In his view, edu-
cators should refrain from interfering with children’s freedom and happiness.
Instead, they should accommodate children’s different preferences and inclina-
tions, and let children learn from experience at the speed and in the form that fits
them.3 In Rousseau’s world there is no scope for external discipline: “Children
should never receive punishment merely as such; it should always come as the
natural consequence of their fault” (Rousseau 1762, Book II). Rousseau’s views
influenced generations of educational reformers, including Pestalozzi, Froebel,
Montessori, and Dewey. In recent decades, the debate has continued with unre-
lenting intensity. If radical anti-authoritarian parenting and schooling practices
became fashionable in the 1960s and the 1970s, the “Tiger Mom” (Amy Chua)
has recently become the icon of a strict, rule-oriented parenting style which is
1“He who spares the rod hates his son, but he who loves him is careful to discipline him . . . ”
(Proverbs 13:24); “Folly is bound up in the heart of a child, but the rod of discipline will drive it
far from him” (Proverbs 22:15).
2Locke argues, however, that children should be gradually treated as reasoning beings as they
grow up: “If you would have him stand in awe of you, imprint it in his infancy; . . . For liberty
and indulgence can do no good to children; their want of judgment makes them stand in need
of restraint and discipline; and on the contrary, imperiousness and severity is but an ill way of
treating men, who have reason of their own to guide them . . . ” (Locke 1800, p. 40).
3“Zealous teachers, be simple, sensible, and reticent; be in no hurry to act unless to prevent the
actions of others. Again and again I say, reject, if it may be, a good lesson for fear of giving a bad
one. Beware of playing the tempter in this world, which nature intended as an earthly paradise
for men, and do not attempt to give the innocent child the knowledge of good and evil; since you
cannot prevent the child learning by what he sees outside himself, restrict your own efforts to
impressing those examples on his mind in the form best suited for him” (Rousseau 1762, Book
II).
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supposedly at the root of the success of many Asian children.4
Until recently, parenting style has remained outside the domain of mainstream
economics. However, a growing literature shows that preferences and non-cogni-
tive skills can bemolded by parents and educators from early childhood (see, e.g.,
Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua 2006), and that these attributes play an important
role for human and social capital accumulation. Motivated by these findings,
our paper proposes an economic theory of preference formation that casts light
on the determinants and effects of parenting style. In our theory, parenting styles
are equilibrium outcomes that are shaped by economic conditions. We use our
theory to account for broad changes in parenting styles in industrialized coun-
tries over time, and for variation in parenting styles across countries. To our
knowledge, our paper is the first to develop a positive theory of parenting style
for this purpose.
We construct a dynamic model of parenting where parents’ child-rearing choices
are driven by a combination of Beckerian altruism (i.e., a concern for the well-
being of the child) and of a paternalistic drive. Paternalism captures the extent
to which parents disagree with their children’s natural preferences and inclina-
tions. Parents can affect their children’s choices in two ways: either by molding
children’s preferences or by imposing direct constraints on their choices. Echoing
the classification of parenting styles in developmental psychology,5 we define as
permissive a parenting style that allows children to make free choices according
to their natural inclinations, in the spirit of Rousseau.6 We define as authorita-
tive a parenting style where parents attempt to mold their children’s preferences,
with the aim of inducing choices that parents view as conducive to future success
in life. Finally, we define as authoritarian a style where parents restrict children’s
choices, i.e., the parent directly imposes her will on the child rather than taking
the indirect route of molding the child’s preferences. The choice of parenting
style in our theory hinges on the interaction between parental preferences and
4Chua presents her argument in “Battle Hymn of the Tiger Mother,” Penguin Press, 2011.
5In her seminal contributions, Baumrind (1967, 1971, 1978) proposes a threefold classification
of parenting styles into authoritarian, permissive, and authoritative; see Section 6.
6In recent times, the term “permissive” has acquired a negative connotation. Here, we refer
to the original notion in Baumrind. Permissive parents do not neglect their children, but they are
lenient and refrain from imposing strict supervision and discipline.
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the characteristics of the socioeconomic environment.
We apply our theory to the transmission of time preference (patience), a prefer-
ence trait that has been shown to be important for human capital and wealth ac-
cumulation (see, e.g., Doepke and Zilibotti 2008). Here we identify paternalism
as the innate tendency of parents to care relatively more about their children’s
future-oriented investments than do the children themselves, as witnessed by
the relentless struggle of many parents to push their reluctant children to study
diligently for school. From the parent’s standpoint, the child has a natural ten-
dency to shirk in educational effort. Parents can deal with this moral hazard issue
by monitoring their children and coercing them to work hard (authoritarian par-
enting). The downside of the authoritarian strategy is that it limits the child’s
freedom, and this has its own costs in terms of human capital investment. For
example, some independence may be necessary for the child to discover her true
talents. Alternatively, parents can mold their children’s preferences so as to align
them with their own (authoritative parenting). The downside of authoritative
parenting is that it imposes an immediate welfare cost on the child. Permissive
parenting avoids these costs, but does not resolve the moral hazard problem.
Building on these ideas, we can envision societies as being distinguished by the
return to human capital investment and by the comparative advantage of parents
in transmitting skills to their children (or its opposite, the economic return to
independence). In traditional societies with a strong incumbency advantage and
low social and occupational mobility, children usually do well by adopting their
parents’ profession. In such societies, we would expect authoritarian parenting
to dominate. In contrast, authoritative parenting should prevail in societies with
a high economic value of making independent choices (for example, because of a
high return to matching one’s occupation with one’s talents) and a high return to
human capital. Finally, permissive parenting is attractive if the return to human
capital investment is low.
The theory is consistent with historical trends in parenting styles in industrial-
ized countries. Authoritarian parenting, as measured by practices such as cor-
poral punishment, has been declining over time. In the 1960s and 1970s, per-
missive practices (anti-authoritarian parenting) gained in popularity. In recent
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decades, we observe a new trend towards more engaged and intrusive parenting
(especially among the well educated) aimed to foster children’s achievements in
education and other endeavors. For instance, time use surveys show a marked
increase in the time parents spend on educating their children, despite the fact
that parents also work more (Ramey and Ramey 2010). However, the nature
of this new form of intensive parenting is authoritative and shuns the coercive
methods of yesteryear.
We argue that the decline in authoritarian parenting is driven by rising economic
returns to independence. The continuous increase in the division of labor in in-
dustrialized societies has greatly increased the number of occupations, making
it less likely that a child’s talents are well matched with the occupation of the
parent. In addition, as emphasized by Galor and Tsiddon (1997) and Hassler and
Rodriguez Mora (2000), even within professions the specialized knowledge of
the parent may have less value when there is rapid technological change. For
example, in agriculture long-held practices and techniques became less valuable
when agriculture was mechanized with the spread of the tractor. Similarly, the
knowledge acquired by a clerical worker before the information-technology rev-
olution is of little use to their children entering similar occupations today. These
trends imply that parents have incentives to grant their children more indepen-
dence by letting them acquire general human capital through formal education.
This erodes the direct control over children that is a precondition for an authori-
tarian parenting style.
Regarding the rise of authoritative parenting in recent decades, our theory sug-
gests that this trend is tied to an increase in the return to education and effort.
In the 1960s and early 1970s, economic inequality had reached a historic low,
and there was little unemployment. In those days, the returns to pushing chil-
dren to exert effort were moderate relative to the value of granting them freedom
and independence. For sure, the “hippie” movement that is often identified with
the trend towards anti-authoritarian parenting also had other (e.g., political) mo-
tives, but our analysis suggests that broad economic trends played an important
role in its success.7
7This cultural tendency is well captured by Pink Floyd: “We don’t need no education; we
don’t need no self-control; no dark sarcasm in the classroom; teacher, leave the kids alone!”
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The decades since the 1980s have brought a reversion in economic trends and an
accompanying waning of the hippie values. Inequality has risen, in large part
due to an increase in the returns to education and skill. Our theory predicts that
this change should induce a shift towards more intrusive parenting aimed at in-
creasing children’s drive for education and achievement. Consistent with this
prediction, we observe a decline in anti-authoritarian parenting and the arrival
of a new model of intensive parenting that is often referred to as “helicopter par-
enting.” While comprising some elements of prohibition, helicopter parenting is
predominantly authoritative in nature, as its goal is to form responsible children
who will “do the right thing” and become high achievers on their own accord.
A general implication of our theory is that permissive parenting is less attractive
when the stakes are high, i.e., when adult-style behavior is especially important
for children’s future success. Thus, we should expect little permissive parenting
in unequal societies where early effort can have a large effect on one’s position
later in life. In contrast, in more equal societies parents should be more inclined
to grant children independence and room for self-discovery. We test this pre-
diction using data from the World Value Surveys, which provide information
on which attitudes or values parents emphasize in child rearing. We document
that, in accordance with the predictions, in countries with low inequality (such
as Germany and the Scandinavian countries), parents emphasize values such as
“independence” and “imagination” over “importance of hard work” or “obedi-
ence.” The opposite pattern is observed in more unequal countries such as the
United States and China.
In the following section, we develop our general framework of preference trans-
mission in a dynastic model. In Section 3, we apply the model to the transmission
of time preferences across generations, and in Section 4 we confront the predic-
tions of this theory with evidence on variation in parenting styles over time and
across countries. Section 5 discusses extensions. In Section 6, we relate our paper
to the existing literature in economics and psychology. Section 7 concludes. All
proofs are contained in the mathematical appendix.
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2 A Dynastic Model of Preference Transmission
2.1 The Decision Problems of Parents and Children
Themodel economy is populated by overlapping generations of two-period lived
people. Each old agent (parent) has one child. The period utility functions de-
pend on a preference vector, a 2 A, and on vectors of economic choices in young
age, xy; and in old age, x. Children’s preferences can be influenced by parents.
The preference vector a is acquired in young age and remains constant through-
out an individual’s lifetime. However, age has also an independent effect on pref-
erences and choice. For instance, the young may be intrinsically less patient or
less risk averse than the old. Thus, there are separate period utility functions for
the young Uy(xy; a) and for the old U o(x; a), and in general Uy (x; a) 6= U o (x; a).
The young only make economic decisions, xy 2 Xy, whereXy is the choice set of
the young. The choice set captures all restrictions to which the young are subject,
including budget constraints but potentially also additional restrictions imposed
on them by their parents. When old, people turn into parents and make three
sets of decisions. First, they make a second round of economic choices, x 2 X ,
where X is the choice set of the old. Second, they mold their children’s prefer-
ences, a0 2 A. Third, they may impose restrictions on the choice set from which
their children will be able to choose, Xy 2 X y, where X y is the set of feasible
choice sets. Parents can always choose to leave their children unconstrained, in
the sense of not imposing additional restrictions over and above the restrictions
implied by budget constraints. More formally, XFREE 2 X y; where XFREE is
the unrestricted choice set defined by XFREE = f[XyjXy 2 X yg. As we shall
see, paternalistic preferences provide a motive for parents to influence their chil-
dren’s choices by either restricting their choice set or by molding their prefer-
ences. We abstract from direct costs that parents may incur when investing in
their children’s preferences or restricting the children’s choice set. This simplifies
the analysis without changing the key implications, because the parents are still
affected by the costs (and benefits) that these choices impose on their children.
We formulate the decision problems of the young and the old recursively, using
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the preference vector a as the state variable. The value function of an old adult,
v (a) ; is given by:
v(a) = max
a02A;x2X;Xy2X y
fU o (x; a) + zw (Xy; a; a0)g :
Here w (Xy; a; a0) is utility parents derive from their child’s experience, and z
measures the overall degree of altruism. The utility derived from children is
given by:
w (Xy; a; a0) = (1  )Uy (xy; a0) + U o (xy; a) + v (a0) : (1)
When evaluating (1), parents anticipate how their child’s choice of xy hinges on
the child’s preferences a0 and choice set Xy, so that xy is given by a decision rule
xy = xy (a0; Xy) : The function w (Xy; a; a0) comprises both an altruistic and a pa-
ternalistic component. Altruism is the standard enjoyment of the child’s own
utility as in Becker (1974). Paternalism, in contrast, is represented as evaluating
the child’s actions through the lens of the parent’s utility function.8 For the first
period of the child’s life, the altruistic component enters with weight 1   (first
term), and the relative weight on paternalism is given by  (second term). Pater-
nalism applies only to the young, and not to the old felicity of the child. Hence,
the child’s old-age utility enters as v(a0) (third term), where  is the discount fac-
tor between the young and the old period and v(a0) is the value function of the
child in old age. Restricting paternalistic motives to the young period is broadly
realistic because preferences change with age, implying that there is more scope
for conflict with an adolescent child. The formulation also has the advantage that
it implies a recursive representation of the choice problem, which is used widely
in related dynastic settings (such as the endogenous fertility model of Barro and
Becker 1989). The decision rule xy (a0; Xy) is determined by the utility maximiza-
tion of the young child, given her own preferences and the choice set imposed on
8Note that, contrary to the literature on imperfect empathy, we do not assume that parents
have an intrinsic drive to reproduce their own preferences. Even a perfectly paternalistic parent
could desire her child to have different preferences from her own.
7
her by the parent:
xy (a0; Xy) = argmax
xy2Xy
fUy (xy; a0) + v (a0)g : (2)
To simplify the exposition, we introduce the assumption that there exists a par-
ticular preference vector a = a such that for given xy, x, the period utility is
maximized in a cardinal sense:
Assumption 1. There exists a 2 A such that for all a 2 A and for all feasible x; xy:
U o (x; a)  U o (x; a) ;
Uy (xy; a)  Uy (xy; a) :
Under this assumption, perfectly altruistic parents (i.e.,  = 0) would always set
a = a irrespective of their own preference vector. While the assumption is not
essential for our results, it is useful to sharpen the contrast between altruistic and
paternalistic behavior.9
2.2 Incentives for Preference Transmission and Choice Restric-
tions
We now examine parents’ incentives for influencing their children through pref-
erence transmission and through choice restrictions. Let a denote the optimal
choice of a0 2 A from the parent’s perspective. Given (1), a satisfies:
U o (xy (a; Xy) ; a) + (1  )Uy (xy (a; Xy) ; a) + v (a)
 U o (xy (a0; Xy) ; a) + (1  )Uy (xy (a0; Xy) ; a0) + v (a0) (3)
for all a0 2 A. Consider, first, the case in which xy (a0; Xy) is independent of a0. In
particular, this is always the case when the choice set Xy is a singleton.
9In more general environments a could be state dependent, as in our previous work (Doepke
and Zilibotti 2008).
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Lemma 1. Suppose xy is independent of a0: Then, a = a:
Intuitively, if the child’s preferences do not affect her choices in young age, the
parent has no reason to deviate from the preferences that maximize the child’s
happiness (a0 = a).
Consider, next, the general case in which xy does depend on a0. Now, the parent
may wish to distort the child’s preferences away from a in order to manipulate
the child’s choice. To achieve this goal, a paternalistic parent is willing to inflict
a utility loss on the child. In the extreme case where  = 1 and  = 0, the parent
would impose her own preferences on the child, namely, she would choose a0 to
maximize U o (xy (a0; Xy) ; a) : In general, the parent faces a tradeoff between the
child’s happiness and the parent’s desire to see the child behave in a particular
way.
To cast light on this tradeoff, suppose that the child’s choice of xy is continuous,
that the objective function is differentiable with respect to xy, and that the opti-
mal choice is interior. Then, the first-order condition of the child’s problem, (2),
yields:
Uyxy (x
y; a0) = 0; (4)
where xy 2 Xy. Moving backwards to the parent’s choice of a0, if the objective
is differentiable and the optimal choice for a0 is interior, the following first-order
condition with respect to a0 has to be met:
xya0 (a
0; Xy) U oxy (x
y; a)
+ (1  ) (Uya0 (xy (a0; Xy) ; a0) + Uyxy (a0; Xy) xya0 (a0; Xy)) + va0 (a0) = 0:
Using (4) (i.e., applying the envelope theorem), the first-order condition simpli-
fies to:
xya0 (a
0; Xy) U oxy (x
y; a) + (1  )Uya0 (xy (a0; Xy) ; a0) + va0 (a0) = 0:
The first term reflects the paternalistic motive to distort preferences. The other
terms reflect the altruistic motive to maximize the child’s utility. Note that when-
ever either  = 0 (no paternalism) or xya0 = 0 (preferences do not affect the child’s
9
choice), the first term vanishes, and hence the parent sets a0 = a.
Next, consider the parent’s choice of the child’s choice set:
Xy = argmax
Xy2X y
w (Xy; a; a0) :
Let fxyg denote the singleton set consisting only of xy:Moreover, let
xy = argmax
xy
w (fxyg ; a; a)
be the parent’s wish for what the child should choose. If fxyg 2 X y; then the
solution to the parent’s problem is straightforward: the parent restricts the child’s
choice to Xy = fxyg, i.e., the child is forced to do exactly what the parent would
like her to do. Given that the child has no independent choice, it is then also
optimal to set a0 = a.
In general, however, the parent may be unable to impose her preferred choice
on the child, i.e., we may have fxyg =2 X y: In particular, this will be the case if
there is a tradeoff between the degree of autonomy that a child has (i.e., the size
of the choice set Xy) and the specific choices that are available. In this case, it
may be optimal for the parent both to mold the child’s preferences and to impose
restrictions on the child’s choice set, but without removing all autonomy.
2.3 Parenting Styles
We can now define parenting styles within our theory (cf. Baumrind 1967), de-
pending on whether, and how, the parent chooses to influence the child.
Definition 1. We distinguish among three parenting styles:
1. A parent is said to be authoritarian if she restricts the child’s choice (Xy 6= XFREE).
A parent is said to be purely authoritarian if she restricts the child’s choice set to a
singleton, implying that the child has no independent choice.
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2. A parent is said to be authoritative if she chooses a0 6= a. A parent is said to
be purely authoritative if, in addition, she allows the largest possible choice set,
Xy = XFREE .
3. A parent is said to be permissive if she chooses a0 = a and gives the child access to
the largest possible choice set, Xy = XFREE .
Our results above imply that for extreme values of the extent of paternalism 
only one parenting style is possible. Specifically, when  = 0, the parent has full
empathy with the child’s preferences, and adopts a permissive parenting style
by setting a0 = a and Xy = XFREE . Conversely, when  = 1 and when the pref-
erence vector only affects utility in young age, the parent disregards the young
child’s desires, and adopts a purely authoritative style. For interior values of pa-
ternalism (0 <  < 1), different combinations of authoritative and authoritarian
elements are possible. The case for restricting the child’s choice set is stronger
when the parent decides not to shape the child’s preferences, and yet disagrees
with the choices the child would make independently. Both the parent’s desire
to influence the child and her ability to do so (in terms of which choice sets are
available) generally depend on economic conditions.
2.4 Economic State Variables
Inmany applications, the dynastic choice problemwill have additional state vari-
ables, such as human capital or savings. Incorporating such economic state vari-
ables is straightforward. Foreshadowing the application to patience below, we
focus on the case where the decision xy when young feeds back into economic
opportunities when old. Let s denote the parent’s vector of economic state vari-
ables. The state s affects the parent through its impact on the choice set X , i.e.,
we have X = X(s). For example, if s corresponds to human capital, a higher
value for s will increase the parent’s earnings and thus lead to larger consump-
tion possibilities. The child’s state vector s0 is a function of the young-age choice
xy:
s0 = g (xy) : (5)
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With these modifications to the setup, the value function for an old adult, v(s; a);
is given by:
v(s; a) = max
a02A;x2X(s);Xy2X y
fU o (x; a) + zw (Xy; a; a0)g ;
where, as before:
w (Xy; a; a0) = U o (xy; a) + (1  )Uy (xy; a0) + v (g(xy); a0) :
The child’s decision rule xy (a0; Xy) is given by:
xy (a0; Xy) = argmax
xy2Xy
fUy (xy; a0) + v (s0; a0)g ; (6)
where the maximization is subject to the law of motion (5). Including such eco-
nomic state variables leaves the definition of parenting styles, and the analysis
of the tradeoffs between permissive, authoritative, and authoritarian parenting,
unchanged.
3 Patience and Investment in Skills
To shed light on the socio-economic determinants of parenting style, in this sec-
tion we apply the general model to a salient dimension of individual prefer-
ences: patience. The underlying friction is that children innately are less patient
than their parents would like them to be. As a result, children may be unwill-
ing to make future-oriented investments, such as educational effort, at the level
that their parents would consider optimal. We believe that since future-oriented
choices are a key area of disagreement between parents and children, applying
the model to patience can help uncover broad determinants of parenting style.
We assume that parents who are concerned about lack of patience can increase
the children’s relative appreciation of future rewards by imbuing them with a
sense of guilt about immediate gratification. A more patient child will be more
willing to undertake future-oriented investments; however, this comes at a cost of
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lower utility for the child. Alternatively, parents can be authoritarian, i.e., directly
force their child to undertake the investment that the parent considers optimal.
But this option also has costs, because it interferes with the child’s occupational
choice. Being authoritarian is possible only if the child can be monitored, which
requires keeping the child at home. Staying at home, in turn, also implies that the
child will have to enter the same occupation as the parent, which may not be the
child’s comparative advantage. Thus, there is some benefit of granting the child
independence. For example, a child born on a farm may be allowed to study in
the city, so as to ultimately enter the occupation that best suits the child. Once the
child has moved to the city, however, the parent loses control over her choices,
and the child may decide to slack off rather than make the necessary investment
for her future success.10 Given these tradeoffs, we will see that parenting choices
depend on the relative importance of human-capital investment, skill transmis-
sion within the family, and the importance of matching talent with occupation
for future success.
3.1 The Decision Problem with Endogenous Patience
We parameterize preferences by a utility function that induces a constant in-
tertemporal elasticity of substitution. For adults, the economic choice x consists
solely of old-age consumption co, i.e., x = co. The adult felicity is given by:
U o(x; a) = uo(co) =
(co)1 
1   ;
where co is a scalar denoting old-age consumption. We assume 0 <  < 1, im-
plying that utility is positive. The young-age choice xy is a vector consisting of
an occupational choice and an educational investment, which together imply a
(possibly state-contingent) level of young-age consumption cy. The young-age
10Our parable is consistent with the recent findings of Bursztyn and Coffman (2012). They
document in an experimental study that parents prefer transfers conditional on their children
attending schools to larger unconditional transfers, while the result is reversed if they are offered
a text message notification whenever their children miss school. They interpret the finding as
evidence of an intergenerational conflict in schooling decisions, with lack of monitoring creating
an agency problem similar to that captured by our theory.
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felicity is given by:
Uy(xy; a) = E(uy(cy; a)) = E

(   a)(c
y)1 
1  

:
Here the parameter  > 1 captures the preference for instant gratification of the
young. The preference parameter a 2 A = [0;    1] is chosen by the parent, and
captures the extent to which the parent stifles the child’s enjoyment of young
age. Young-age felicity is maximized when the parent sets a = a = 0; however,
by choosing a higher a the parent can render the child more patient.11
There are many occupations indexed by i 2 I . The productivity of an individual
in occupation i has two components: first, there is her individual talent for that
occupation, which is high (yH) or low (yL < yH) with equal probability; second,
there is a premium for working in the same profession as one’s parent, denoted
by   1. This premium reflects the acquisition of skills within the family as
well as entry barriers (e.g., guilds or professional associations that protect in-
cumbent families). An individual’s earnings also depend on the human capital
investment effort e in young age. This effort can be interpreted both as effort in
formal education and as the acquisition of skills on the job. Effort e is measured
in terms of young-age labor, and bears return R in terms of increasing old-age
earnings.12 The return R is related to the return to human capital accumulation.
For an individual with productivity y 2 fyH ; yLg and effort e 2 [0; 1], the lifetime
consumption profile is:
cy = y (1  e) ;
co = y (1 +Re) :
The choice of occupation interacts with the choice of location. If the child stays
at home, the child enters the parent’s profession, and the parent retains control
11Note that in this application a affects only the young-age felicity. One could alternatively ar-
gue that patience also yields a better ability to enjoy future consumption. This could be captured
by assuming that Uo(x; a) = f (a) c
1 
1  ; where f is an increasing function. This specification
would give similar results. Our specification implies the convenient normalization that a = 0,
entailing no loss of generality.
12In our formulation, e reduces young-age consumption. However, the mechanism would also
work if e caused a direct utility loss (say, through lower enjoyment of leisure).
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over the child’s effort choice. Thus, the child makes no independent choice in
young age. The decision to keep the child at home is made before the parent
knows the child’s talent for this occupation. In contrast, if the child leaves home
and becomes independent, the parent has no control over the child’s effort, and
the child chooses the occupation that best suits her talent. Thus, talent will al-
ways be high (y = yH) in the chosen profession. From the parent’s standpoint,
there are two aspects to the tradeoff between the two locations. First, on the skill
side, keeping the child at home adds the incumbency premium, but forgoes the
opportunity for the child to find her true calling. Second, on the preference side,
keeping the child at home allows the parent to monitor effort. Since the child is
impatient, she will exercise more effort if monitored at home than if she is inde-
pendent. For any positive level of paternalism  > 0, the independent child’s
low effort causes a utility loss for the parent.
The young-age choice xy is a vector composed of the child’s educational effort e0
and occupational choice i0. The previous discussion implies that the set of feasible
choice sets X y comprises two subsets, X y = fXHOME; XFREEg: Here XHOME is
the choice set for a child that stays at home. Since the parent retains control,
it is optimal for the parent to assign the effort that is optimal from the parent’s
perspective, which we denote by e. In addition, the child is forced to adopt the
parent’s occupation. We therefore have:
XHOME =
8><>:
0B@ e0
i0
1CA
 e0 = e; i0 = i
9>=>; :
Alternatively, the parent may grant independence to the child, in which case
the child can freely choose from the full range of feasible effort and occupation
choices:
XFREE =
8><>:
0B@ e0
i0
1CA
 0  e0  1; i0 2 I
9>=>; :
The utility of the old does not depend on a, but only on the economic state vector
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s = fy; eg. The value function of the old can be written as:
v (y; e) =
(y (1 +Re))1 
1   + z maxa02A;Xy2X y w (X
y; a0) :
We can now analyze the optimal parenting choices of a0 2 A and Xy 2 X y.
3.2 Decision Problem of Authoritarian Parent
Consider, first, an authoritarian parent who keeps the child at home and moni-
tors effort (i.e., the choice set XHOME is imposed). In this case, Lemma 1 implies
that the parent will choose a0 = 0: Since the parent is uncertain about her child’s
productivity in the home profession, her continuation utility involves expecta-
tions:
w
 
XHOME; 0

= Ey
"
(+ (1  ) ) (y
0 (1  e))1 
1   + v (y
0; e)
#
= ~w
 
XHOME; 0

+ z max
a002A;Xy2X y
w (Xy; a00) ;
where
~w
 
XHOME; 0

=
1 
2
 
y1 H + y
1 
L

 
(+ (1  ) ) (1  e)
1 
1   + 
(1 +Re)1 
1  
!
(7)
and:
e = argmax
e0
(+ (1  ) ) (y
0 (1  e0))1 
1   + 
(y0 (1 +Re0))1 
1  
=
1 

(+(1 ) )
R
 1

1 +R

(+(1 ) )
R
 1

: (8)
It is useful to note, for future reference, that e ! 1 as R ! 1: Thus, for large
16
R; ~w
 
XHOME; 0

is determined entirely by the old-age felicity.13 Conversely, we
have e = 0 if R = 0: There is no point in exerting effort if the return to effort is
zero.
3.3 Decision Problem of Non-Authoritarian Parents
Consider, next, a parent who grants independence to the child by selecting the
choice set XFREE . Unless the incumbency premium  is very large, the child
moves to the city and chooses the occupation according to her comparative ad-
vantage, thus y = yH .14 The parent’s continuation utility can be broken down as
follows:
w
 
XFREE; a0

= ~w
 
XFREE; a0

+ z max
a002A;Xy2X y
w (Xy; a00) ;
where
~w
 
XFREE; a0

= y1 H 
(+ (1  ) (   a0)) (1  e (a
0))1 
1   + 
(1 +Re)1 
1  
!
(9)
and:
e (a0) = argmax
e0
(   a0) (yH (1  e
0))1 
1   + 
(yH (1 +Re
0))1 
1  
=
1 

  a0
R
 1

1 +R

  a0
R
 1

: (10)
We can now characterize the optimal choice of a0, i.e., the degree to which the par-
ent stifles the child’s enjoyment of young age in order to induce more patience.
13This result hinges on the assumption that  > 1; implying that the substitution effect domi-
nates over the income effect.
14We assume that even if the child eventually chooses the same occupation as her parent, the
incumbency premium  is available only if the child stays at home.
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Lemma 2. Conditional on a non-authoritarian parenting style, the optimal choice of the
child’s preferences a0 satisfies the following condition:
0    (   a0   1) cya0(e (a0))| {z }
marginal benefit of increasing a0
  (1  ) c
y(e (a0))
1  | {z }
marginal cost of increasing a0
(11)
or:
0   (   a0   1)
0B@ 1

1
   a0
1
1 +

  a0
R1 
 1

1CA  1  
1   ; (12)
where the strict inequality holds if and only if a0 = 0:
Themarginal benefit in (11) is positive since increasing the child’s patience causes
a fall of the child’s consumption (cya0 < 0), and thus an increase in the human cap-
ital investment that the parent approves of. The marginal cost captures the utility
loss suffered by the child from being “brain-washed” with responsible, adult-like
values. How the parent weighs costs and benefits depends on the extent of pa-
ternalism . If  = 0, the marginal benefit vanishes, and the optimal solution is
a corner, a0 = 0, corresponding to a permissive parenting style. By continuity, a
permissive parenting style is also optimal for a range of low ’s. In contrast, if
 = 1 the parent does not care about the utility loss inflicted on the child. In this
case it is optimal to set a0 =    1, i.e., the parent adopts a purely authoritative
style, inducing the child to take the same action as an authoritarian parent would
prescribe. The following lemma summarizes this discussion.
Lemma 3. Let a denote the optimal choice of a0; defined implicitly by (12). There exists
 > 0 such that, for all   ; a = 0 (permissive parenting style). For  = 1; a =   1
(purely authoritative parenting style).
We can now establish a key result regarding the role of the return to human cap-
ital investment R for the choice between permissive and authoritative parenting.
Proposition 1 (Choice Between Permissive and Authoritative Parenting). Sup-
pose that  >   
  (1 ) ; and let R 

 (1 )
(  (1 ))  
 
1 

 

 1
1 
: The optimal a0 is
determined as follows:
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1. If R  R; then a = 0:
2. If R > R; then a > 0 and a is strictly increasing in R; with an upper bound
equal to a = limR!1 a =     1   :
Conversely, if     
  (1 ) ; then a
 = 0 independently of R.
Conditional on granting the child independence, the parent adopts a permissive
style if the return to human capital is low (R < R), and an authoritative style
if the return to human capital is high (R  R). In the high range, the extent to
which the parent molds the child’s preferences is increasing in R.15
3.4 Equilibrium Parenting Style
We can now analyze the choice between authoritarian and non-authoritarian (i.e.,
either permissive or authoritative) parenting. This choice hinges on the return to
incumbency . In particular, for a fixed R, there exists a unique threshold ^(R)
such that for   ^(R) parents choose to be authoritarian.
Figure 1 displays the optimal parenting style as a function of the return to human
capital R and the incumbency premium  for  = 0:95. The figure shows that the
critical level ^(R) above which parents are authoritarian is first decreasing and
then increasing in R. The reason is that the threshold depends on the severity of
the agency problem in choosing education effort. If R = 0, there is no disagree-
ment, because parents and children agree that optimal effort is zero. Nor is there
any agency problem if R ! 1, since then parents and children agree that maxi-
mum effort should be devoted to education.16 Thus, the agency problem is more
severe for intermediate values of R. In this region controlling the effort of the
child becomes more attractive for the parent, and thus the threshold ^(R) shifts
15Note that the condition  >     (1 ) implies that, if  < 1; then     1   <    1: Hence,
a <    1 for  < 1:    1 is only attained by fully paternalistic parents.
16In this case, an authoritarian parenting style is chosen over permissive parenting only if the
incumbency premium exceeds the value of flexibility. This threshold is denoted as  in Figure 1
and defined in Proposition 2.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium Parenting Style for  = 0:95 as a Function of Incumbency
Premium  and Return to Human Capital R .
downward (i.e., to the left in Figure 1). Interestingly, the ^(R) function is con-
stant (i.e., the boundary between authoritarian and the other parenting styles in
Figure 1 is vertical) when either  = 0 or when  = 1. The reason is that in these
extreme cases the agency problem is entirely resolved, either because the parent
completely agrees with the child ( = 0) or because the child is indoctrinated to
completely agree with the parent ( = 1).
Now consider the choice between authoritative and permissive parenting for
 < ^(R). As shown in Proposition 1, in this region there is a fixed threshold
R such that for R > R, parents are authoritative, and for R  R they are permis-
sive. Proposition 1 implies that for sufficiently low , authoritative parenting is
never optimal. That is, if we lower , the boundary between permissive and au-
thoritative parenting in Figure 1 first shifts upward and then disappears entirely.
Our results for the optimal choice of parenting style are summarized in the fol-
lowing proposition.
Proposition 2 (Equilibrium Parenting Style). Suppose that  >   
  (1 ) : Then,
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there exists a function ^(R) where 0 < ^(R)   such that:
 If   ^(R), parents choose a purely authoritarian style.
 If   ^(R) and R > R, parents choose a purely authoritative style.
 If   ^(R) and R  R, parents choose a permissive style.
Conversely, if     
  (1 ) , then:
 If   ^(R), parents choose a purely authoritarian style.
 If  < ^(R), parents choose a permissive style.
Here R is the threshold characterized in Proposition 1 and  is the threshold where the
incumbency premium exactly offsets the value of flexibility, given by:
    2y1 H  =  y1 H + y1 L  11  :
Moreover, we have (0) = limR!1 ^(R) = , and ^(R) <  for 0 < R <1.
Hence, there are three regions of the parameter space corresponding to each of
the parenting styles. For a high incumbency premium, the authoritarian style
is optimal. For a low incumbency premium and a low return to human capital,
permissive parenting is adopted. Finally, for a low incumbency premium and a
high return to human capital, parents choose to be authoritative.
4 Historical Trends: From the Demise of Authoritari-
anism to the Rise of Helicopter Parenting
In this section, we confront the predictions of Proposition 2 with the data. We
first consider the historical evolution of parenting styles in the Western world,
focusing in particular on evidence from the United States and the United King-
dom. Next, we consider implications for the variation in parenting styles across
countries today.
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4.1 The Historical Evolution of Parenting in Western World
Traditional societies are characterized by high incumbency premia, little formal
human capital investment, and a relatively small range of possible occupational
choices. Until the onset of industrialization, most people in the Western world
were engaged in agriculture, a sector where children work with their parents and
incumbency (e.g., through land ownership) is important. There was relatively
more mobility among city dwellers working as artisans or craftsmen, but even
there much of skill acquisition took place within the family, and incumbency ad-
vantage was often protected formally through guilds. Our theory predicts that
in such a setting, the authoritarian parenting style should dominate. Given that
parents and children lived and worked together, parents could control their chil-
dren directly and did not need to mold their preferences. Similarly, a permissive
parenting style had severe downsides in a setting where children had few oppor-
tunities outside their own family’s occupation, and the consequences of failure
could be serious.
The prediction of our theory accords well with historical evidence for the pre-
industrial period of widespread use and approval of corporal punishment, which
is a key attribute of authoritarian parenting.17 Based on a sample of autobiogra-
phies and diaries, Pollock (1983) documents that in terms of the range of disci-
plinary techniques, “surprisingly little changed from 1500 to 1699” (p. 156). His
findings are echoed by Plumb (1975), who notes that of “two hundred counsels
of advice on child-rearing prior to 1770, only three, Plutarch, Palmieri and Sado-
leto, failed to recommend that fathers beat their children” (p. 65). With regard to
parenting style in North America, Kaestle and Vinovskis (1980) report that “the
early Puritans had stressed that children were innately evil . . . The only proper
response for parents was to watch their children closely and to discipline them at
very young ages.”
With the rise of industrialization in Western Europe and North America in the
17The association of corporal punishment with an auhoritarian parenting style is well docu-
mented. For instance, Hyman (1997) writes: “Truly authoritarian societies emphasize unques-
tioning loyalty to leaders, reflexive obedience to authority, and the foolishness of dissent. Chil-
dren are taught at home and school that they must not question requests by authorities, including
parents, and that punishment will invariably follow disobedience” (p. 6).
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nineteenth century, an increased division of labor brought about a rise in occu-
pational specialization. Moreover, the monopoly power of guilds was eroded
over time, and from the middle of the nineteenth century education increasingly
took place in schools and universities. These trends reduced the advantage of
incumbency and increased the importance of choosing an occupation based on
talent rather than following in a parent’s footsteps. Our theory predicts that these
changes, over time, should make authoritarian parenting less attractive. And, in-
deed, social historians document a gradual change in attitudes towards children
and parenting in these times. Pollock (1983) argues that some changes already
began in the late eighteenth century, mostly in the middle and upper ranks of so-
ciety. Influenced by Rousseau and subsequent reformers, the view of “children
. . . as innocent beings that had to be protected and nurtured,” and of childhood
as a “distinct phase of human development that required special attention and
training” gained ground in the more progressive sectors of society (Kaestle and
Vinovskis 1980, p. 192).18
The same trends continued in the twentieth century: the practice of corporal
punishment declined progressively as close-knit patriarchal families gradually
were replaced by a newmodel where children received formal education outside
the home, and only few children continued in their parent’s occupation.19 Even
within occupations, the more rapid pace of technological change led to a faster
depreciation of knowledge, which reduced the amount of useful knowledge that
parents could teach to their own children.20 The decline of authoritarian par-
18Yet, the change was slow, and significant differences in parenting styles across geographi-
cal areas and social groups emerged during the nineteenth century. According to Guttormsson
(2002), the influence of enlightened educators was stronger in the industrial areas of northwest-
ern Europe, where changes in parent-child relations were intimately related to the development
of urban, middle-class families. Among these groups, “the mood was shifting away from beating
as a routine punishment . . . towards the application of moral and emotional pressures developing
in children a capacity for self-government” (Guttormsson 2002, p. 267–268). In contrast, the au-
thoritarian parenting style remained unquestioned within the working class, often accompanied
by abuses related to widespread drunkenness.
19Long and Ferrie (2013) report that in the United States, which had exceptionally high oc-
cupational mobility already in the nineteenth century, intergenerational mobility across broad
categories (farmer, white collar etc.) actually fell going into the twentieth century. However,
occupations also became more differentiated, so that parental experience was less likely to be
relevant even for children who stayed within the parent’s broad category.
20For example, a parent whoworks as an accountant may lack the computer skills necessary for
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enting accelerated in the 1960s with the rise of the anti-authoritarian “hippie”
culture.21 At this time, inequality measures, which had been falling from the late
nineteenth century, reached an all-time low (see Piketty and Saez 2003). In addi-
tion, educational attainment was rising, but the college premium fell (Katz and
Murphy 1992, Gottschalk 1997). According to our theory, the combination of a
low incumbency premium and a low return to human capital investment made
permissive parenting attractive during this time.
The move away from authoritarian parenting within families was also reflected
in changes at the level of societies. In 1979, Sweden became the first country
to ban corporal punishment. Finland, Norway, and Austria followed suit in the
1980s, and since then a large number of industrialized countries introduced sim-
ilar measures.22 Teaching practices in schools also evolved. Darling (1994) con-
trasts primary education in Great Britain during the 1950s, when pupils were ex-
pected to keep quiet, listen, and obey the teacher, with the situation at post-1960s
schools, where “there are audible signs of activity and discussions . . . prohibition
is inappropriate and seems, at least for much of the time, unnecessary” (p. 1).
A Scottish primary school memorandum cited by Darling (1994) states: “Many
teachers have proved that in the permissive yet controlled atmosphere of the
classroom where there is a flexible organisation . . . all can achieve success at ap-
propriate levels. In addition, self-reliance and initiative are developed, and the
pupils have opportunities of pursuing individual enthusiasms . . . ” (p. 42). Simi-
larly, when asked by the Schools Council Investigation of 1972 what they hoped
to achieve with children by the time they left primary school, teachers in England
gave the following preferred answers (from a list of seventy-two suggested aims):
(i) “children should be happy, cheerful and well-balanced;” (ii) they should “en-
new entrants in the occupation; see Hassler and Rodriguez Mora (2000) and Galor and Tsiddon
(1997).
21Note that another interpretation of our model is that talent is about the intrinsic appreciation
of some professional activity (e.g., becoming a painter or an artist). In a period of a falling incum-
bency premium, this type of appreciation for choosing one’s own path would be accentuated.
22The decline of corporal punishment is also reflected in survey data. A longitudinal study
of German parents between 1996 and 2008 shows a sharp increase in the proportion of parents
opposed to any form of corporal punishment (see Bussmann and Schroth 2009). In 2007, only
four percent of Swedish parents and about 17 percent of Austrian and German parents reported
spanking their children. The same study documents significantly higher tolerance for corporal
punishment in France and Spain.
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joy school work and find satisfaction in their achievements;” (iii) “individuals
should be encouraged to develop in their own ways” (Darling 1994, p. 48). Ac-
cording to Darling, this shift in attitudes was favored by the economic condi-
tions. During the 1960s, Britain enjoyed widespread prosperity, low unemploy-
ment, and little inequality, implying that “parents had every reason to assume
that when their children left school they would be able to get jobs without much
difficulty” (Darling 1994, p. 50).
Since the 1970s, evidence suggest that the premium to incumbency has fallen
even more. Hsieh et al. (2013) document that over the last few decades society in
the United States has become significantly more fluid, namely, there is more oc-
cupational mobility, lower gender- and race-related barriers in the labor market,
and an improved allocation of talent. In addition, since the 1970s wage inequal-
ity across workers of a given education level started increasing. Marimon and
Zilibotti (1999) and Violante (2002) interpret this fact as evidence of a growing
importance of matching individual talent and occupation. Both the reduction in
frictions in the labor market and the increased role of individual talent imply a
lower relative importance of incumbency. In terms of the return to human cap-
ital, however, the trend towards lower inequality has reversed since the 1970s.
Since the 1980s income inequality has increased, largely driven by increasing re-
turns to education and within-group earning inequality, especially in the United
States and the United Kingdom. This new trend raises the stakes in parenting,
in the sense that acquiring education and putting in high effort throughout one’s
career gain in importance for economic success.
In our model, this change is captured by a higher return R to human capital in-
vestment, which increases the benefit of authoritative relative to permissive par-
enting. And indeed, in the data we observe a new trend towards more involved
parenting. Ramey and Ramey (2010) show that in the United States, weekly
hours spent in childcare by mothers and fathers have increased markedly from
the mid-1980s.23 This rise in childcare has given rise to the widely discussed
phenomenon of helicopter parenting, i.e., the observation that parents “hover”
23Ramey and Ramey (2010) suggest that this trend may be driven by increased competition for
admission to top colleges. We formalize a similar mechanism, although here the broad return to
education matters, rather than competition for spots at the most elite institutions.
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over their children at various activities to guide and protect them. At the same
time, the support for coercive methods and corporal punishment has continued
to slide; instead, the modern parenting style is authoritative in nature.24
Ramey and Ramey also discuss additional features of the data that line up well
with our theory. First, they document that in neighboring Canada parenting time
increased much less than in the United States. This is consistent with the obser-
vation that the return to education also increasedmuch less in Canada, leading to
lower stakes in parenting and thus less intensive parental involvement. Ramey
and Ramey also show that within the United States, the increase in parenting time
is concentrated among college-educated parents. One interpretation of this fact is
that in college-educated families the return to education is higher (due to inheri-
tability of skill and oblique transmission in the family), so that these families were
more strongly affected by the rise in the education premium. A complementary
explanation is that there are differences across education groups in the technol-
ogy of preference transmission. Specifically, a college education may improve
parents’ ability to motivate their own children and instill education-oriented val-
ues in them, i.e., educated parents may have a comparative advantage at author-
itative parenting.25 This accords with a literature in developmental psychology
showing that authoritative methods are used more frequently in educated fam-
ilies, whereas less educated parents are more prone to resort to authoritarian
methods and respond less to the rising skill premium in their parenting choices
(Kohn 1977, Straus and Stewart 1999).26
Figure 2 summarizes our interpretation of the historical evolution of parenting
styles. We view pre-industrial economies as characterized by a high incumbency
24The waning appeal of permissive parenting is also reflected in the debate on teaching prac-
tices. Over the last two decades, we observe a new shift of emphasis in school authorities towards
tests and high achievement. Yet, this counterrevolution did not reinstate, for themost part, the co-
ercive methods of the 1950s. Rather, the combination of motivational and learning goals resemble
characteristics of authoritative parenting (see Darling 1994).
25Suppose, for instance, that there are high- and low-skill parents, and that low-skill parents
can only choose their children’s preferences in the range a 2 [0; ~a]; where ~a <    1: In this case,
paternalistic low-skill parents would resort to authoritarian methods, whereas high-skill parents
endowed with the same degree of paternalism would achieve their goals by influencing their
children’s preferences.
26A complementary argument is put forward by Weinberg (2001), who argues that poorer par-
ents have limited ability to affect their children through pecuniary incentives.
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Figure 2: Evolution of Parenting Styles Over Time, Driven by Shifts in Incum-
bency Premium  and Return to Human Capital R.
premium  and a low return to human capital R. Hence, initially an authori-
tarian parenting style is adopted. Subsequently, industrialization brought about
an erosion of incumbency advantage, an increase in occupational specialization,
and a rising demand for human capital. These trends are represented by a fall
in  and a modest rise in R, moving the economy towards a higher prevalence
of permissive parenting. The most recent historical period has been character-
ized by a further decline in the incumbency premium  and a sharp rise in the
return to human capital R, leading to the current situation where authoritative
parenting is dominant.27
27Figure 2 is drawn for a particular value of the paternalism parameter . We view the pop-
ulation as heterogeneous in , and to some extent the incumbency premium and the return to
human capital investment may vary across families as well. Thus, the evolution depicted in Fig-
ure 2 does not necessarily affect all families equally, but should be interpreted as broad trends
that shift the distribution across the parenting styles in the population.
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4.2 Parenting Across Countries
The theory also bears predictions for parenting styles across countries. The dis-
cussion in Section 4.1 suggests that as a country develops, the return to incum-
bency  falls, triggering a decline of authoritarian parenting. Thus, one should
expect a negative relationship between GDP per capita (a standard measure of
economic development) and the authoritarian parenting style. Our model also
predicts that, among advanced economies where authoritarian parenting has al-
ready declined, one should find a positive correlation between inequality and
parental effort devoted to an authoritative parenting style. In Figure 2, two coun-
tries with the same  but with different R’s could lie, respectively in the SW
region (dominated by permissive parenting style) and in the NW region (domi-
nated by authoritative parenting style). Even if one compares economies within
the NW region, in an economy characterized by greater inequality (i.e., higher
R) parents will adopt, ceteris paribus, a more proactive authoritative parenting
style, i.e., they will choose a higher a0:
To test these implications we consider data from the World Value Survey, where
people are asked which attitudes or values they find most important in child
rearing.28 The valuemost closely associatedwith an authoritarian parenting style
is “obedience.” In addition, “independence” in children should be negatively
correlated with authoritarian parenting. “Hard work” and “thrift and saving
money” are typical features of an authoritative style. Finally, emphasizing the
values of “imagination” and “independence” represents a more permissive (or
less intrusive) parenting style.29
Consider first the margin between authoritarian and non-authoritarian parenting
style. The correlation between the fraction of parents emphasizing obedience and
28The data is from the 5th wave of the World Value Survey (corresponding to survey years
2005–2007). Parents can choose up to five of the following values: “independence;” “hard work;”
“feeling of responsibility;” “imagination;” “tolerance and respect for others;” “thrift and saving
money;” “determination and perseverance;” “religious faith;” “unselfishness;” and “obedience.”
29The values of “feeling of responsibility” and “determination” are not clearly identified with
one of the parenting styles; in particular, these values may be emphasized by authoritative par-
ents, but are also related to independent thinking and thus the permissive parenting style. We
therefore omit these values from the main analysis, and show later that our results are robust to
including them.
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GDP per capita is -0.52, and for independence the correlation is 0.42.30 These cor-
relations are what our theory predicts, provided that, realistically, poorer coun-
tries are characterized by a higher incumbency advantage, less occupational dif-
ferentiation, and less formal schooling. The likely path of development would
lead to the demise of authoritarian parenting as countries develop.
Next, consider the margin between the authoritative and permissive styles. We
are interested in particular in whether parents are more authoritative in unequal
societies, as predicted by the theory. We restrict attention to OECD countries,
since our theory predicts that for countries with a large return to incumbency
(which is typical for poorer countries) an increase in R has no effect on parenting
style. Inequality is measured by the incomeGini coefficient in 2005.31 Confirming
the predictions of the theory, we find that hard work is positively related to in-
equality (correlation coefficient of 0.80), whereas the correlation with inequality
is negative for independence (-0.55) and imagination (-0.56). All these correla-
tion are highly significant. Scatter plots of these relationships are displayed in
Figure 3. The results are robust to several checks: (i) excluding Turkey, a poorer
country than the rest of the OECD; (ii) controlling for GDP per capita; (iii) includ-
ing the countries that joined the OECD after 1994 (although here the correlation
between hard work and Gini turns insignificant).32 The correlation between the
inequality measure and thrift is positive but low and insignificant.
The patterns for specific countries accord well with the general picture. Sweden
and Norway have low inequality, and they have among the highest shares of re-
spondents valuing imagination and independence in child rearing. The situation
is similar in Germany and Switzerland. Scandinavians, Germans, and the Swiss
also attach the least importance to transmitting the value of hard work to their
30The data on GDP per capita is for the year 2005 from the Penn World Tables 7.1. Both corre-
lations remain highly significant after controlling for religious faith, which could be argued to be
a cultural determinant of parenting attitudes.
31Data on Gini coefficients are from the OECD.We restrict the baseline sample to countries that
were OECD members before 1994. This leaves us data for sixteen OECD countries: Australia,
Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nor-
way, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States. We also report the results when
five countries that became members since 1994 (Chile, Korea, Mexico, Poland and Slovenia) are
added.
32Chile and Mexico are outliers, displaying large inequality but a low emphasis on hard work.
The relationship is stable across the other recent OECD members.
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Figure 3: Parenting Values and Inequality across OECD Countries.
Notes: Parenting values are measured by fraction of parents that consider a given “quality that
children can be encouraged to learn at home” especially important, from 5th wave the World
Value Surveys, 2005–2007. Income inequality is measured by Gini coefficient in 2005, fromOECD.
children. In the much more unequal United States, parents place more empha-
sis on the value of hard work and less on that of independence. Imagination is
also valued less by American parents. The main outlier from the general pattern
is France, where inequality is at a medium level, but parents endorse authorita-
tive values. Outside of the OECD, China has among the most extreme parenting
values: the score of imagination is very low, whereas the value of hard work
is emphasized by 90 percent of the respondents (compared to 62 percent in the
United States and only 11 percent in Sweden). This is once again consistent with
our theory, as China exhibits high inequality and underwent a dramatic increase
in the return to education over the two last decades (see Ge and Yang 2014).
To summarize the data, we run a principal component analysis among the four
values of interest. The first principal component, accounting for 64 percent of
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Principal Component 1 2 3 4
Loading on Independence 0.55 -0.19 0.79 -0.17
Loading on Imagination 0.58 0.24 -0.18 0.75
Loading on Hard Work -0.58 -0.15 0.51 0.62
Loading on Thrift -0.13 0.94 0.28 -0.13
Percent of Variance Explained 0.64 0.26 0.07 0.03
Correlation with Gini Coefficent -0.69 -0.07 0.17 0.52
Table 1: Principal Component Analysis for Values that Parents can Emphasize in
Raising Children among 16 OECD Countries.
Notes: Data from 5th wave of World Value Surveys, 2005–2007.
the variation in the data, loads positively on independence and imagination, and
negatively on hard work and thrift (see Table 1). This component thus indicates
a more permissive and less authoritative parenting style. We find that, consis-
tent with the theoretical predictions, the first component is negatively correlated
with income inequality, with a correlation coefficient of -0.69.33 The scatter plot
for inequality and the first principal component is displayed in the bottom-right
panel of Figure 3. The second component already explains much less of the vari-
ance, and loads mostly on thrift. This component is uncorrelated with the Gini
coefficient, suggesting that additional factors drive the transmission of this value.
Our results are robust to including additional variables that are less clearly iden-
tified with a particular parenting style. The values of “determination” and “re-
sponsibility” could equally be linked to the permissive and authoritative parent-
ing styles. In the case of “obedience,” one might suspect that this value proxies
for an authoritative style in countries where the authoritarian parenting style is
obsolete.34 Adding these values to the principal component analysis does not
33The results again are robust to excluding Turkey, controlling for GDP per capita, and includ-
ing the countries that became OECD members after 1994.
34In practice, the distinction between authoritative and authoritarian parenting is less clear-cut
than in the theory. A proactive and engaged parenting style aiming at induce high achievements
is often intertwined with some prohibitions. For instance Amy Chua, the “Tiger Mom” and icon
of helicopter parenting, writes (Wall Street Journal, January 8, 2011): “A lot of people wonder
how Chinese parents raise such stereotypically successful kids. . . .Well, I can tell them, because
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significantly change the results. The first principal component (which now ex-
plains 56 percent of the variance) loads negatively on hard work and obedience,
and positively on the other variables (with the score of thrift being close to zero).
The first principal component is still strongly correlated with inequality (with a
correlation of -0.66).
In summary, the analysis of the World Value Survey data indicates that our pre-
dictions are borne out empirically. In countries with low inequality (such as
Germany, Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries), parents emphasize val-
ues such as “independence” and “imagination” over “importance of hard work”.
The opposite pattern is observed in more unequal countries such as the United
States and China.
Beyond inequality, there are additional factors that our theory would predict to
determine parenting style. Institutional features of the education system are an
important example. In some countries, vertical teaching and the memorization
of facts are emphasized in secondary schools, and access to the best universities
is rationed by high-stakes university entrance exams. In such countries, par-
ents have a stronger incentive to push their children towards hard work during
adolescence. Depending on other factors, this could take the form of either au-
thoritative or authoritarian parenting. In contrast, in other countries (such as the
Scandinavian countries and Germany) secondary schooling is less intense and
access to higher education less competitive. Emphasizing values such as “imagi-
nation” and “independence,” which may pay off later on, should be more attrac-
tive in such places. This dimension might help explain, for example, the case of
France. Teaching in French schools is vertical, and access to the country’s elite
system of grandes e´coles highly restricted. Hence, parents emphasize hard work
at the expense of independence and imagination, even though overall inequality
is relatively low.35
I’ve done it. Here are some things my daughters, Sophia and Louisa, were never allowed to do:
attend a sleepover; have a playdate; be in a school play; complain about not being in a school
play; watch TV or play computer games; choose their own extracurricular activities; get any
grade less than an A; not be the No. 1 student in every subject except gym and drama; play any
instrument other than the piano or violin; not play the piano or violin.”
35The importance of teaching practices for the accumulation of social capital is emphasized by
and Algan, Cahuc, and Shleifer (2013).
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5 Additional Applications of the Theory
The general framework we develop above can be applied to other dimensions
of preferences, and additional state variables can be introduced to examine in-
teractions with other economic decisions. In this section, we outline some key
implications of such extensions.
5.1 Endogenous Patience with Transfers to Children
Besides influencing children’s preferences and choices, parents typically make
other economic decisions that affect their children’s well-being. In the working
paper version (Doepke and Zilibotti 2012), we extend the model of Section 2 to
allow for the possibility of additional economic state variables affecting the child,
such as monetary transfers, health, and the transmission of specific skills. We in-
clude economic state variables also in the analysis in Section 3, but there only
old-age opportunities depend on these. The analysis of such decisions is related
to the large literature—stretching back to Becker’s rotten kid theorem (Becker
1974 and 1981)—that studies the strategic relationship between parents and chil-
drenwhen there is an incentive for the child to deviate, ex post, from the behavior
prescribed by her parent. However, in the existing literature preferences are ex-
ogenous, and parents cannot affect their children’s behavior through preference
manipulation.
As an example, consider an environment where parents affect their children’s
patience and, in addition, make inter-vivos transfers to them. Returning to the
parable of the child who leaves the farm to study in the city, we can envision
parents providing financial resources to support the child’s expenses. A new
agency problem arises from disagreement between parent and child on how the
transfer should be used, i.e., saved for the future or consumed immediately. If
the child stays on the farm (authoritarian parenting style), the parent controls
the savings decision, and the agency problem is averted. If the parent chooses a
strong form of authoritative parenting, such that a0 =    1, then the child can be
fully trusted and, again, the agency problem is resolved. However, a paternalis-
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tic parent who chooses not to exercise full control over the child (i.e., a0 <    1)
ends up disagreeing with the child’s consumption-savings choice. Such parents
react to the disagreement by reducing their inter-vivos transfer. Hence, disagree-
ment between parent and child can lead to persistent effects on wealth accumu-
lation within dynasties.
5.2 Risk Aversion
The theory can be applied to another important dimension of preferences, namely,
risk aversion. Risk aversion is known to increase with age (Morin and Suarez
1983, Pa˚lsson 1996), leading to a natural possibility of conflict between parents
and children regarding risk-taking by children. Risk aversion is also known to
matter for different aspects of human behavior. For instance, Barsky et al. (1997)
document that risk tolerance is associated with hazardous behaviors that tend to
lower economic success, such as smoking and drinking, but also with a more ag-
gressive investing style that yields higher average returns, such as holding stocks
rather than bonds. Risk tolerance is also an important driver of entrepreneur-
ship as shown, among others, by van Praag and Cramer (2001), Cramer et al.
(2002), and Kan and Tsai (2006). Dohmen et al. (2012) document that trust and
risk attitudes are strongly correlated between parents and children in the German
Socio-Economic Panel. Using the same data set, Zumbuehl, Dohmen, and Pfann
(2013) find that parents who invest more in child-rearing efforts are more similar
to their children in terms of attitudes towards risk. All these studies concur on
the importance of the transmission of attitudes towards risk within families.
We discuss the case of risk aversion in detail in the working paper version of this
paper (Doepke and Zilibotti 2012). Here we provide a sketch of the key tradeoffs.
Preferences are parameterized by a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility
function inducing a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). The endogenous part
of risk aversion is denoted by a 2 [0; a], where higher a implies a higher risk
aversion. The old-age felicity is given by:
U o(x; a) = E

c1  a   1
1     a
x ;
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where c is a function of the choice x, which is interpreted as a lottery, i.e., a risky
choice. In this application, it is natural to think of the child as an ”adolescent”.
The adolescent felicity is given by:
Uy(x; a) = E

c1 +  a   1
1   +    a
x :
We assume that  > 0, so that for a given underlying preference parameter a,
adolescents are less risk averse than are adults. The lower risk aversion of chil-
dren can lead to disagreement between parents and children about the appropri-
ate degree of risk taking.
In every period, parents and children choose from a choice set that consists of
lotteries over consumption. We interpret these lotteries broadly to include juve-
nile risky choices such as smoking, taking drugs, or riding motorcycles, as well
as old-age decisions such as occupational choices that entail varying degrees of
income uncertainty (related, for example, to the returns to entrepreneurship).
Paternalistic parents may disagree with their children’s choices and hence may
wish to either restrict the lotteries available to the child (authoritarian parenting)
or instill more risk aversion in their children (authoritative parenting).
In this setting, the choice of parenting styles hinges on the interaction among pa-
ternalism, the riskiness of the surrounding environment, and the availability of
entrepreneurial opportunities. On the one hand, parents would like their chil-
dren to avoid juvenile risks (such as gangs or street drugs). On the other hand,
parents would like them to be capable, later in life, to seize entrepreneurial op-
portunities. Since preference traits are formed in childhood and persist through-
out adult age, parents face a tradeoff. The crux is the exposure to juvenile risk.
If juvenile risk is pervasive (as, for instance, in crime-ridden urban neighbor-
hoods), parents may opt to instill into their children a strong risk aversion, in
order to avoid trouble, even if greater safety comes at the expense of economic
returns later in life. In safer environments (e.g., wealthy suburbs), parents would
instead encourage risk tolerance and an entrepreneurial attitude.
An important distinction is that between exogenous and endogenous risk. If
juvenile risk is unavoidable (e.g., because the family lives in a country plagued by
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war and terrorism), then risk tolerance is valuable, since it helps the child to cope
with an uncertain life.36 On the other hand, if juvenile risk-taking is endogenous
in the sense of being controlled by the child (e.g., she can choose whether or not
to get involved with street gangs), then altruistic parents would emphasize the
value of playing it safe. Private and public institutions affecting the return and
risk of entrepreneurial activities also affect the distribution of parenting styles in
equilibrium.
Unlike in the application to patience, in the case of risk aversion parental prefer-
ences affect incentives for preference transmission. More risk averse parents will
worry more about the risk-taking of their children, and are therefore more likely
to mold their children as risk averse. This feature leads to persistence of pref-
erences and occupational choices within dynasties, and potentially to macroeco-
nomic path dependence (see Doepke and Zilibotti 2012, 2013).
5.3 Social Preferences
Our theory can be applied also to the transmission of social preferences. Pro-
social preferences such as trust, other-regarding preferences, and interpersonal
skills are correlated with better economic outcomes at the individual and social
levels, see, e.g., Camerer and Fehr (2006). Upbringing and socialization are im-
portant determinants of such preferences (Fehr and Hoff 2011, Heckman, Pinto,
and Savelyev 2013). Social behavior is often a source of disagreement between
parents and children, with parents typically discouraging the natural tendencies
of their children to behave in an aggressive or anti-social manner. The incen-
tive for altruistic parents to teach social behavior varies with the extent to which
such behavior is rewarded in society. For instance, in societies where aggression
and abuse are the norm, teaching children other-regarding preferences may be
dangerous. The opposite is true in societies where aggressive and opportunistic
behaviors are penalized by social norms or law enforcement.
While the formation of social preferences has been analyzed in the cultural trans-
36This is consistent with the findings in Bchir and Willinger (2013), who document that people
living close to an active Peruvian volcano are more risk-tolerant than people living in safer areas.
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mission literature (see, e.g., Hauk and Saez-Marti 2002), our theory is the first
that links these explicitly to parenting styles: Authoritative parents aim to in-
still social preferences into their children, whereas permissive and authoritarian
parents do not interfere with children’s natural inclinations (although authori-
tarian parents might sanction anti-social behavior). The theory has two main
implications. First, there may be path dependence in the accumulation of social
preferences. Pro-social parents may attach more value to the social skills of their
children, and they may also be more effective at transmitting such skills. This
leads to persistence of social preferences within dynasties. In addition, external-
ities can induce self-reinforcing mechanisms and multiple equilibria: in a society
where authoritative parenting is pervasive, social norms that sanction deviating
behavior may emerge. Second, the formation of social preferences may interact
with other dimensions of parenting. For example, if parents adopt an author-
itarian parenting style with respect to time preference (as in our main applica-
tion above), this may spill over to the transmission of social preferences. More
specifically, children in authoritarian families may interact less with others and
be subjected to coercive methods, both of which may work against the forma-
tion of pro-social skills and feed parochialism. Consistent with these predictions,
Alesina and Giuliano (2013) document that strong family ties are negatively cor-
related with generalized trust, while Alesina and Giuliano (2011) find that they
are conducive to lower political participation.
6 Related Literature
The concept of parenting style originates from developmental psychology. In her
seminal contributions, Baumrind (1967, 1971, 1978) proposes the threefold classi-
fication of parenting styles into authoritarian, permissive, and authoritative that
is still dominant today. Since then, many studies in psychology have attempted
to identify causal effects of parenting style on children’s preferences, personal-
ities, and outcomes (see, e.g., Aunola, Stattin, and Nurmi 2000, Chan and Koo
2011, Darling and Steinberg 1993, Dornbush et al. 1987, Spera 2005, and Stein-
berg et al. 1991).
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There exists a limited economic literature on parenting, influenced by the seminal
contributions of Becker and Tomes (1979) and Mulligan (1997). Weinberg (2001)
focuses on parents’ influence on their children’s behavior through pecuniary in-
centives. He argues that, due to the scarcity of means, low-income parents have
limited access to such incentives, and therefore resort to authoritarian methods
such as corporal punishment. Such authoritarian methods, in turn, are at the
root of the lower success of their children, and perpetuate the initial inequality.
Our theory focuses on a broader set of parenting choices, and ignores, for sim-
plicity, pecuniary costs of parenting.37 Lizzeri and Siniscalchi (2008) assume that
altruistic parents are better informed than their children about the consequences
of certain actions. Parents can then intervene to protect children from the con-
sequences of ill-informed choices. However, this comes at the cost of reducing
children’s ability to learn from experience. The paper focuses on a different di-
mension (information accumulation) of parenting practices, and is therefore com-
plementary to ours.38 Bhatt and Ogaki (2012) construct a model of tough love in
which parents evaluate the child’s lifetime utility with a constant high discount
factor, whereas the child’s patience is assumed to be inversely related to con-
sumption. In this environment, parental transfers are distorted strategically to
affect the child’s discount factor. Different from our paper, these authors postu-
late a direct relationship between preferences and consumption. Cosconati (2009)
estimates a two-period model of parenting style in which children differ in their
predisposition to human capital accumulation, and argues that this affects the
optimal choice of parenting style. None of these papers develops a theory that
encompasses all three main parenting styles emphasized in the psychology liter-
ature, or uses the theory to explain variation in parenting styles over time and
across countries.
Our paper is related more generally to the large literature on cultural transmis-
sion and norms, including Bisin and Verdier (2001), Bisin and Verdier (2010),
Hauk and Saez-Marti (2002), Saez-Marti and Zenou (2012), and Tabellini (2008
and 2010). A common assumption in this literature is imperfect empathy. Imper-
37Pecuniary incentives are also considered in Hao, Hotz, and Jin (2008), who focus on birth
order effects. Specifically, parents maywant to punish older childrenmore severely for unwanted
behavior, in order to built up a reputation for toughness vis-a`-vis the younger children.
38Other information-based theories include Adriani and Sonderegger (2009, 2014).
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fectly empathic parents desire, by assumption, that their children adopt the par-
ents’ cultural traits (such as religion). Parents’ effort in shaping their children’s
values determines the probability of successful transmission. When transmis-
sion fails, children copy the trait of a random member of the population. Differ-
ent from this approach, our model is framed in a dynastic model where parents
have both altruistic and paternalistic motives. In our model, even fully pater-
nalistic parents have no exogenous drive to reproduce their own traits. Rather,
preferences may be persistent across cohorts within dynasties as an equilibrium
outcome.39 Interactions between parental transmission of preferences and oc-
cupational choice are also central to the analyses of Doepke and Zilibotti (2005,
2008) and Corneo and Jeanne (2010), but in these papers parents are entirely al-
truistic, and alternative parenting styles are not considered.
Another closely related theory is Becker, Murphy, and Spenkuch (2014), who
show that it may be optimal for parents to invest resources in manipulating their
children’s preferences in order to “buy” their support in old age. Such an invest-
ment can be Pareto improving, since parents invest more in the human capital
of their children when they expect more support from them in old age. Becker,
Murphy, and Spenkuch (2014) share with our study the notion that parents can
mold their children’s preferences. However, they abstract from paternalistic mo-
tives in parents’ choice, and they do not consider alternative parenting styles. In
turn, we ignore the consequences of parents investing in their children’s prefer-
ences on old-age insurance, which is the focal point of their study. Thus, the two
papers are complementary. Conversely, Lundberg, Romich, and Tsang (2009)
and Romich, Lundberg, and Tsang (2009) focus on the non-cooperative interac-
tion between paternalistic parents and myopic children. These papers focus on
the parental choice between letting children decide autonomously, sharing deci-
sion making with them, or imposing decisions on them; and, on how this choice
influences children’s decision-making as they turn adolescent. Their empirical
analysis is guided by a model where parents decide how much time to invest
in controlling their children, while the children decide how much resistance to
stage against parental control, at the cost of reducing family harmony and their
39A more thorough review of the similarities and differences between the two approaches can
be found in Saez-Marti and Zilibotti (2008).
39
resources. These dimensions, from which we abstract, are also complementary
to our analysis.
In our model, authoritative parenting distorts the child’s preferences away from
those that would maximize their welfare in a utilitarian sense. Such interven-
tion can therefore be interpreted as instilling a form of “guilt” that induces the
child to behave responsibly, and in particular to avoid choices that adults view as
inappropriate. For instance, the responsible child is induced to study diligently
for an exam instead of playing with friends. This feature links our work to the
recent paper by Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Greenwood, and Guner (2014), where al-
truistic parents choose how strongly to stigmatize sex, trading off the marginal
gains from instilling a taboo against its costs. The focus of their paper is how an
episode of technical change, i.e., the introduction of modern contraception, has
changed over time the benefits, and thus the incidence, of the taboo. However,
they do not discuss alternative parenting styles.
Our paper also has links to the recent literature on time-inconsistent decision
making and temptation. In the application to patience in Section 3, dynasties
display quasi-hyperbolic discounting, as in Laibson (1997). The possibility of
restricting choice sets to deal with this time-inconsistency is related to Gul and
Pesendorfer (2003), who propose an axiomatic decision theory of a rational agent
who is subject to a temptation problem. Specifically, the choice set includes ele-
ments that would appeal to him, but whose choice he anticipates he would re-
gret. The agent chooses optimally whether to succumb to temptation or to resist,
knowing that even resisting induces a utility loss (e.g., not ordering an appetiz-
ing dessert at a restaurant). In this environment, the decision maker may wish
to restrict the choice set ex ante. In our model, similarly, an adult may find it
optimal to restrict the choice set of the next member of the dynasty. The tradeoff
between restricting choice and letting children follow their inclinations is related
to the tradeoff between commitment and flexibility in Amador, Werning, andAn-
geletos (2006), who build on Gul and Pesendorfer but add an information friction
that implies a downside to overly restricted choice sets.
Our application to patience is also related to the recent empirical literature em-
phasizing the importance of patience for savings and human capital investment
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(see, e.g., Mischel, Shoda, and Rodriguez 1992, Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua
2006, Reyes-Garcia et al. 2007, and Sutter et al. 2013). Similarly, the application
to endogenous risk aversion relates to the literature on the determinants of en-
trepreneurship, namely individual risk tolerance (see Doepke and Zilibotti 2013).
More generally, our paper relates to the growing literature on the formation and
accumulation of cognitive and non-cognitive skills, examples of which are pa-
tience, self-discipline, and social skills, see, e.g., Cunha and Heckman (2008),
Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010), and Segal (2013). While these studies
focus mainly on the production function for such skills, our framework provides
a rationale for how differences in socio-economic conditions can affect parental
investments in children. Elucidating such determinants is useful from a policy
perspective. Heckman and Mosso (2014) show, for example, that the success
of intervention programs targeting poor families with small children hinges on
whether a program stimulates parental investments and improves parent-child
interactions (see also Cunha and Heckman 2009 and Heckman, Pinto, and Save-
lyev 2013). These findings underscore the importance of understanding how par-
enting styles are chosen, and how policy interventions can affect those choices.
7 Conclusions
The recent economic literature has turned increasingly to preference heterogene-
ity in its attempts to solve micro- and macroeconomic puzzles. The persistence
of low economic development, for instance, has been linked to the prevalence of
cultural traits that are not conducive to entrepreneurship and innovation (Gorod-
nichenko and Roland 2010, 2011). In turn, the developmental psychology liter-
ature has long argued that parenting style can affect individual values, prefer-
ences, and beliefs. There is, however, little understanding of the determinants of
parenting styles. In this paper, we provide a formal economic theory of child-
rearing that rationalizes the emergence of different parenting styles as equilib-
rium outcomes. A cornerstone of our theory is the notion of paternalism: par-
ents do not always accept their children’s preferences and inclinations, and typi-
cally regard influencing or constraining their children’s behavior as part of their
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parental duties. Our theory predicts that different parenting styles are the ratio-
nal outcomes of the interaction between parental paternalism and the economic
environment.
We apply ourmodel to the intergenerational transmission of patience. The theory
yields predictions for how the economic characteristics of a country determine
the prevalence of different parenting styles. In particular, the theory is consis-
tent with historical evidence that authoritarian parenting declines as economic
development advances. Moreover, the theory is consistent with evidence that in
the industrialized world, parents in low-inequality countries are more permis-
sive and emphasize values such as independence and imagination, whereas in
high-inequality countries parents place more stock in hard work, a value typi-
cally associated with an authoritative parenting style.
The theory can be extended in several directions. For instance, one could let pa-
ternalism result from an evolutionary process. Our analysis suggests that there
is no golden rule about the fitness of paternalistic preferences. In our main appli-
cation (patience), paternalism has high fitness, as it induces human capital accu-
mulation, contributing to the economic success of paternalistic dynasties. In an
application to risk preferences, parental paternalism reduces risk-taking and pro-
tects children from juvenile risk but can also stifle entrepreneurship. Therefore,
the success of paternalistic families depends on the preference trait, the economic
environment, and the stage of economic development.
One could also consider self-reinforcing mechanisms operating through general
equilibrium effects. In a companion paper, we study the interaction among pref-
erence formation, innovation, and growth in a model where patience and risk
tolerance are endogenous (see Doepke and Zilibotti 2013), and where the distri-
bution of preferences has a general equilibrium effect via an endogenous choice
between entrepreneurship and other occupations (although in that paper, we ab-
stract from paternalism and endogenous parenting style). One could go even
farther and study how parenting style feeds back into the determination of poli-
cies, institutions, and social norms. Such extensions are left to future research.
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A Mathematical Appendix
A.1 Proofs for Lemmas and Propositions
Proof of Lemma 1: The proof is by contradiction. Suppose a = a^0 6= a: Given
(3), we then have:
(1  )Uy (xy; a^0)+U o (x^0; a^0)+zU o (x^y0; a^0)+z(1 )Uy (x^y0; a^00)+2zv(a^00)
 (1  )Uy (xy; a) + v (a)
 (1  )Uy (xy; a)+U o (x^0; a)+zU o (x^y0; a)+z(1 )Uy (x^y0; a^00)+2zv(a^00);
where x^0, x^y0, a^00 denote optimal future choices given that preference parameter
a^0 is chosen today. Note that these choices differ from the optimal future choices
which would obtain if a0 = a . Thus, imposing these choices in the continuation
after a0 = a can only decrease future utility on the right-hand side of the inequal-
ity. This explains the second inequality.40 Also notice that the first term on both
sides of (3) drops out because xy is independent of a0.
Canceling terms, the first and third line of the expression above imply:
(1  )Uy (xy; a^0) + U o (x^0; a^0) + zU o (x^y0; a^0)
 (1  )Uy (xy; a) + U o (x^0; a) + zU o (x^y0; a) :
But this cannot be true, since Assumption 1 implies that Uy (xy; a)  Uy (xy; a^0) ;
U o (x^0; a)  U o (x^0; a^0) ; and U o (x^y0; a)  U o (x^y0; a^0) : We thus obtain a contradic-
tion, and must have a = a: 2
Proof of Lemma 2: First, note that
cy(e (a0)) =
y1 H (1  e (a0))1 
1   :
40This is because the parent is fully altruistic towards the old-age choices of the child, meaning
that a version of the envelope theorem applies.
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Next, differentiating e (a0) yields:
de (a0)
da0
=
1 +R
R

1 +R

  a0
R
 1

2    a0R
 1 

:
Thus, differentiating cy(e (a0))with respect to a0 yields:
cya0(a
0) =
y1 H
1   (1  e (a
0))1   de (a
0)
da0
=   y
1 
H (1 +R)
1 
R

1 +R

  a0
R
 1

2     a0R
 1 2

;
where the last equality follows from replacing e (a0) by its expression in (10). Sub-
stituting e (a0) ; cy(e (a0)); and cya0(e (a
0) into (11) and rearranging terms yields (12).
Notice that the lemma only states a necessary condition for an optimum. For a
given interior solution satisfying (11) to be a local maximum, onemust also check
that the second-order condition holds. In particular, let:
Q (a0; R) =  (   a0   1)
0B@ 1

1
   a0
1
1 +

  a0
R1 
 1

1CA :
Then, the second-order conditions require that @Q(a
0;R)
@a0 < 0 for the value of a
0 that
satisfies (11) with equality. If the special case  < 1 + , the marginal benefit is
everywhere decreasing in a0, and the local optimum is unique. In particular, the
condition @Q(a
0;R)
@a0 < 0must be true at the global optimum. 2
Proof of Lemma 3: The right-hand side of (12) is negative for  = 0, implying
that a0 = 0 for  = 0 and, by continuity, also for a range of  sufficiently close to
zero. At  = 1, The second term in (12) is zero, and the condition can be satisfied
only by setting a0 =    1, so that the first term is zero as well. 2
Proof of Proposition 1: First note that if     
  (1 ) , the right-hand side of (12)
is negative for any a0 and R. Hence, the inequality is strict and we must have
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a0 = 0. For the case  >   
  (1 ) , the threshold R results from setting a
0 = 0 and
then equating the right-hand side of (12) to zero. Hence, if R = R condition (12)
holds as an equality at a0 = 0, so that a0 = 0 is optimal. For R < R, at a0 = 0
the right-hand side of (12) is negative, so that we are at the corner solution and
a0 = 0 is optimal as well. For R > R, notice that the right-hand side of (12) is
strictly decreasing in R, which implies that the optimal a is strictly increasing in
R also in this range. Finally, when R goes to infinity, the right-hand side of (12)
converges to:
(   a0   1)
(   a0)  
1  
1   :
Setting this expression equal to zero implies that:
a = lim
R!1
a =    1  
   ;
as required. 2
Proof of Proposition 2: The results for the choice between authoritative and
permissive parenting in the region   ^(R) follow from Proposition 1. Here
we need to establish that there exists a ^(R) function that satisfies 0 < ^(R)  
and such that authoritarian parenting is optimal for   ^(R). Consider the case
 = . We have:
~w
 
XHOME; 0

=
y1 H
1  
 
(+ (1  ) ) (1  e)
1 
1   + 
(1 +Re)1 
1  
!
;
~w
 
XFREE; a

=
y1 H
1   
(+ (1  ) (   a)) (1  e (a
))1 
1   + 
(1 +Re (a))1 
1  
!
:
Since under an authoritarian style the choices of a0 and e are optimal from the
parent’s perspective, we have:
~w
 
XHOME; 0
  ~w  XFREE; a :
Now consider the case  = 0. Then, the argument in the text implies that a = 0
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and e (0) = e:Hence, we have:
~w
 
XHOME; 0

=
y1 H
1  
 
 
(1  e)1 
1   + 
(1 +Re)1 
1  
!
= ~w
 
XFREE; 0

:
Thus, the parent is indifferent between being authoritarian and granting freedom
to the child, so that ^(R) =  for all R when  = 0. Similarly, consider the case
 = 1. Then, the argument in the text implies that a =    1 and e (   1) = e;
so that we have:
~w
 
XHOME; 0

=
y1 H
1  
 
(1  e)1 
1   + 
(1 +Re)1 
1  
!
= ~w
 
XFREE;    1 :
Thus, for  = 1 we have ^(R) =  for all R as well. Finally, consider interior
levels of paternalism,  2 (0; 1) : Then, e (a) = e; implying that ~w  XHOME; 0 >
~w
 
XFREE; a

, since e is chosen optimally, and e (a) is distorted from the par-
ent’s perspective. In particular, if the parent is permissive, as long as R > 0 we
have:
~w
 
XHOME; 0

=
y1 H
1  
 
(+ (1  ) ) (1  e)
1 
1   + 
(1 +Re)1 
1  
!
>
y1 H
1  
 
(+ (1  ) ) (1  e (0))
1 
1   + 
(1 +Re (0))1 
1  
!
= ~w
 
XFREE; 0

;
since e (0) < e; and e is by definition optimal. A similar argument applies if the
parent is authoritative (in this case the cost for the parent has two components:
the lower effort of the child and her lower felicity for the child). To summarize,
when  2 (0; 1), the parents prefer to be authoritarian at  = , so that we must
have ^(R) < . In the case R = 0; we have a = 0 and e (0) = e = 0; thus
~w
 
XHOME; 0

= ~w
 
XFREE; 0

. For the case  2 (0; 1) and R > 0, the existence
of a ^(R) 2 (0; ) that yields indifference between authoritarian parenting and
granting freedom to the child follows because the utility of granting freedom
is positive and independent of , whereas the utility of being authoritarian is
strictly increasing in  and converges to zero as  approaches zero. Moreover, for
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 > ^; the proof implies a fortiori that authoritarian parenting is strictly optimal
for all  2 [0; 1]. 2
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